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The purpose of this article is to discuss the international security challenges
facing the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the context of actions taken with
respect to highly dysfunctional countries. However, these topics need to be dis-
cussed with a separate focus on the United States, which is the pillar of NATO, and
at the same time, the key partner and ally of the European Union. After all, the rela-
tions between the UE and NATO involve, among other things, the issue of double
membership of most European countries in both organisations. Therefore it seems
obvious that the U.S. plays a key role in the NATO/EU relations, with the attitude
of individual European countries towards the superpower determining these rela-
tions to a great extent. 
From the moment NATO was established until the end of the Cold War, the
organisation was a guarantor of security in the West under the powerful military
umbrella of the U.S. However, with NATO being a classical military alliance of a
transatlantic nature, maintaining peace and safety on a global level rested on the
shoulder of the UN, which, despite the bipolar division of the world into two hos-
tile political and military blocs, tried to fulfil its mission – with mixed results. After
the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War, it seemed that time
had come to establish multilateral cooperation and entrust peace-enforcement and
peace-keeping missions to the UN. The peak of optimism in this respect came with
the Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations conducted by the international com-
munity under UN auspices in the 1990 and 1991 against the regime of Saddam
Hussein, who had invaded Kuwait. Notwithstanding the hailing of a triumph of
multilateralism and success of the UN, in fact, of the total number of 950 thousand
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troops from 31 countries allied in the UN coalition, nearly 700 thousand were U.S.
soldiers. Irrespective of the number of troops, given the assets (battleships, air
force, armoured weapons) and new combat technologies used, it was actually a
large-scale military operation of the U.S. army. Europe sent slightly more than 62
thousand troops, i.e. 6% of the total number1. 
Thus, there can be no doubt that without U.S. participation, the operation
would have been difficult to accomplish, if not altogether impossible. The broad
public realised the fact in the early 1990s, when the UN was evidently over-
whelmed by the challenges it was faced with. The ineptitude of the UN was clearly
shown by the failed missions in Somalia 1992-1994, Yugoslavia 1992-1995, and
Rwanda 1993-1996. The hasty and largely makeshift solutions used at the time
involved sending NATO-led missions, which, however, raised serious controversies
from the start, as it was claimed that with those operations the largest country of
the Alliance, i.e. the U.S., was seeing to its own strategic interests. Following the
failure of the UNPROFOR forces (1992-1995), which were to establish peace in the
republics of former Yugoslavia, an international NATO-led peace force, legitimised
by the UN Security Council, started a mission of enforcing the provisions of the
Dayton Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-1996). The armed
forces of the United States of America, which was considered to be the only super-
power at the time, became not only the pillar of NATO but also of UN operations.
The role of the 'World's Policeman' (or as the Americans would rather like it –
the 'World's Sheriff') did a disservice to the image of the USA. There was a growing
number of disagreements about the goal and tactics of peacekeeping operations.
For instance, after the fiasco of the Restore Hope peace-enforcement operation in
Somalia (1992-1994), which was sanctioned by the UN but was initially conducted
mainly by U.S. forces, there was a serious disagreement between US officials and
the UN as to the way the mission should proceed, in particular regarding the con-
ditions for the deployment of interventions, even those of humanitarian nature.
The United States criticised the rules of engagement, claiming that they reduced
combat capacities and exposed troops to losses. The U.S. requested a 'blank cheque'
from the UN to deliver interventions according to its own vision. It was proved
afterwards, the Somali operation had tremendous consequences for later develop-
ments, leading to passivity on the part of the United States in those crisis situations
that were irrelevant for the vital interests of the U.S. Incidentally, the attention of
Western politicians at the time was focused on the Balkans, where a bloody war
broke out after the breakup of Yugoslavia, leading to ethnic cleansing. In 1999,
NATO carried out a military operation which led to heated doctrinal disputes about
the limits and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. As a result, countries locat-
ed in the world's peripheries, such as Somalia and Afghanistan, were left to them-
selves or fell pray to extremists or anarchy. The abandonment resulted in a series
of humanitarian disasters and genocide, such as in Rwanda in 1994, when Tutsi
were mass-slaughtered in acts of genocide continuing in front of a small UN con-
tingent, once again showing the helplessness of the United Nations.  This raised an
enormous wave of criticism against the organisation. Following that, EU politicians
started to stress the need to create a European force, which could shoulder the
responsibility for stabilising non-EU territories with crucial importance for the EU
security environment. Thus, some EU countries started to propose speeding up the
development of an independent security and defence policy with the Union's own
armed forces, independent of NATO.
Dysfunctional states in the discourse about international security
The notions of a 'dysfunctional state' and a 'failed state' have become well-
established concepts in modern discourse about international security. When after
the end of the Cold War the establishment of a 'new world order' and harmonious
cooperation of the international community towards stability and security were
proclaimed, few politicians and commentators pointed to the reverse trend of grow-
ing instability. However, at the time, the problem of far-reaching dysfunctionality
and failure of states was treated by most Western policy-makers as a marginal
trend, occurring only on the fringes of international relations. It was considered to
be a local ill typical of the Third World, with little impact on the world's security.
In a short time, the problem of Somalia and Afghanistan showed politicians that
negative phenomena in distant corners of the world may spread, hitting even the
greatest superpower of the modern world. 
Historically speaking, international security had been usually threatened by
strong and aggressive countries. However, at the beginning of the 21st century it
became clear that international security is growingly jeopardized as a result of state
failure processes. Threats to peace and stability no longer depend exclusively on
the relationship between competing countries, but issues traditionally considered
to be internal, including an array of political, social and economic factors2. On top
of this, state dysfunctionality has tended to go hand in hand with asymmetrical
phenomena, such as international terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction
weapons and transnational organised crime3. 
Regions most affected by state dysfunctionality cover vast territories of Sub-
Saharan Africa and Central and Southern Asia, but also the Balkans, which, after all,
lie in Europe. Dysfunctional states are characterised by inefficient public adminis-
tration and economic failure. Regular armed forces are small, poorly trained and
under-equipped. In addition, they are often faced with irregular armed militia,
which are recruited by local tribal leaders, separatists or groups seeking profits.
Such countries are often affected by internal instability and tend to experience per-
manent civil wars or cyclical internal conflicts, which are ended only by external
intervention or destruction of the opponents. Such countries are also 'breeding
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grounds' for war, as absence of control over their borders and territory allow mili-
tary groups to penetrate the neighbours' territories and destabilise their internal sit-
uation. Fighting generates humanitarian disasters, such as genocide, displacement,
starvation and epidemics. Weak and often illegitimate governments are unable to
control the state, which actually becomes a haven for international crime and ter-
rorist organisations. 
Recent years have shown to what extent state dysfunctionality contributes to
destabilising not only the direct neighbourhood but also entire regions. This was
the case with the civil war in Rwanda, which drew in the neighbouring countries,
as a result of which the internal conflict spilled over to Zaire (Democratic Republic
of Congo), fully destabilising the country and causing the death and suffering of
millions of citizens. The outbreak of another internal conflict in the years 1998-
2003 sparked what is referred to as the Great War of Africa, involving eight African
states and 25 armed groups, killing 4-5 million people4. The conflict in Afghanistan
has been destabilising the internal situation in the country's neighbour, Pakistan,
and some young post-USSR states, such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan5. A recent example of how events in a country can destabilise the entire
region is the civil war in Libya, which led to the collapse of the neighbouring Mali
and was stopped only by an external military intervention. Present-day internal
armed conflicts caused by a serious state dysfunctionality include Somalia, Central
African Republic and Southern Sudan.
The 9/11 attacks were a breakthrough in the perception of dysfunctional states as
a potential threat to international security, changing the attitude of the West to the
perception of the problem of international security. To politicians and commentators
the attacks become a turning point, marking the actual end of the Cold War and the
beginning of a new era in international relations6. Beforehand, dysfunctional states
had been treated rather as a source of never-ending humanitarian crises or occasional
regional threats to security and stability7. Meanwhile, as has been shown recently,
they can create a multitude of diversified security threats: such as  terrorist safe
havens8, countries contributing to the proliferation of mass destruction weapon or
destabilising situation in the region, as well as crucial operational hubs of the global
drug business. Dysfunctional states are also mentioned in the context of piracy and
mass migration9. There is also a growing concern about the impact of dysfunctional
states on the natural environment and the resultant threats to ecosystems10.
Dysfunctional states are highly attractive places to crime groups or other enti-
ties causing asymmetrical threats. Their incapacity to regulate political life and con-
trol their own territory creates excellent conditions for non-state organisations to
develop their criminal activities and exploit the country's natural resources. Crime
and terrorist groups can consolidate their structures within a given territory, in par-
ticular by setting up recruitment and training camps. With time, they become
strong enough to act internationally. In Afghanistan, al-Qaeda, which had remained
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outside the control of the Taliban government for many years, established a net-
work of recruitment and training camps for its terrorist activity. According to the
9/11 Commission, appointed by the U.S. president and Congress, 10-20 thousand
terrorists were trained in those camps in the years 1996-200111. There are also well-
organised African al-Quada networks, which are mainly active in 2 regions: the
Horn of Africa, North Africa, and the Sahel. The events in Mali in 2013 showed their
strength.
As can be seen, there has been a gradual securitisation of state failure process-
es, which was not perceived as a national security problem previously. Thus, the
broad concept of security will not only comprise the traditional military sector, but
also the political, economic, social and even environmental sectors. As a conse-
quence, in the early 21st century countries suffering from dysfunctionality are con-
sidered to be a structural deficiency of the international system, which requires the
international community to take specific actions12.
NATO and the new challenges
The new international security challenges and threats faced by the world
towards the end of the 20th century meant a radical change in the thinking about
international security and the role to be played by the North Atlantic Alliance as the
biggest Western defence organisation. Crisis management in countries affected by
the final stage of dysfunctionality required not only military operations, but also
actions to rebuild dysfunctional states. A political agreement in this respect was
reached during the 1991 meeting of NATO heads of government in Rome. Several
years later, the 'New Strategic Concept' was announced as a result of political
arrangements made at the Washington summit. The document identified new
security threats and challenges, while not questioning the fundamental function of
the Alliance. At the same time, NATO assumed the responsibility for supporting
security, stability and preventing conflicts by delivering peace operations and
humanitarian interventions going beyond its mandate. 
The spectacular al-Quada attacks on the USA, which had been devised in 
a highly dysfunctional country, Afghanistan, made the international community
realise that such countries are a threat to stability not only on a regional but also
global level. Ever since, dysfunctional countries have no longer been seen by the
West from the angle of humanitarian and regional problems, but as an element of
the global security strategy.  In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, both Europe and
the U.S. started a serious debate about the need to engage more in solving crises of
highly dysfunctional states, which resulted in the U.S. National Security Strategy of
September 2002, obliging the U.S. government to address the issue of failed states13.
In a sense, the concept of a failed state was redefined and started to be treated as
a major threat for the modern world in the eyes of the West14.
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The 2002 NATO meeting in Prague built on the U.S. National Security Strategy.
As a result of the summit, NATO adopted what is referred to as the Capabilities
Commitment, the purpose of which was to strengthen its military potential and
ensure that European armed forces are equipped in a way allowing efficient and rapid
deployment15. The establishment of the NATO Response Force (NRF) was a signifi-
cant step in this respect. The Force has become the foundation of the Alliance's expe-
ditionary potential, allowing it to deal with a range of missions, from traditional full-
scale military operations to operations supporting humanitarian actions in distant
parts of the world16. The NRF was a turning point, since it was established as a per-
manent force (unlike the usual ad-hoc NATO forces) to be used for rapid response
under any mission the North Atlantic Council deems necessary17.
The central focus of the subsequent November 2006 NATO summit in Ryga
was to discuss the difficulties faced by the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and pro-
pose initiatives aimed to transform the Pact in military terms so as to make it more
fit for expeditionary missions18. In an interview before the Ryga summit of NATO
heads of government, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer expressed 
a view that the new concept needs to take into account a comprehensive approach
and rely not only on military, but also e.g. economic measures. The member coun-
tries should keep a balance between common territorial defence and expeditionary
missions. The Secretary's General words will best illustrate the point:  "Territorial
defence remains a core function, but we simply can no longer protect our security
without addressing the potential risks and threats that arise far from our homes.
Either we tackle these problems when and where they emerge, or they will end up
on our doorstep"19. 
The NATO summits in Strasbourg and Kehl in 2009 were dedicated to the New
Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic Alliance, which was to respond to the
threats to its members in changing international conditions20. The High-Level
Reflection Group appointed in May 2010, with former U.S. Secretary of State,
Madeleine Albright, presented Secretary General with a document which became
the basis for the new NATO 'Strategic Concept', approved during the 19-20 November
2010 Lisbon summit. The key provisions of the new strategy concerning extra-
European missions, mainly in countries affected by conflicts and crises, were com-
mitting the Alliance: "to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict
situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most
importantly the United Nations and the European Union. NATO has a unique and
robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises
– before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix
of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the
potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongo-
ing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in
post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security"21.
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The Strategic Concept highlights aspects related to assured security and
dynamic engagement. In a sense, this resulted from a compromise reached between
the supporters of a military pact focused on delivering traditional NATO objectives,
i.e. territorial defence based on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and those pro-
posing that the Alliance should operate outside member countries' territories, tak-
ing responsibility for politically unstable areas, mainly in Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa. The document stressed the importance of crisis response operations, giving
it the same priority as traditional allied defence, which is best exemplified by the
ISAF operation in Afghanistan, which has been under way since 200322. The
assumptions of the NATO New Strategic Concept are consistent with the provisions
of the European Security Strategy, which is of crucial importance, as most NATO
members are European countries23. The May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago was
not a breakthrough. Rather it focused on following up the conclusions of the Lisbon
meeting and discussing on-going developments, such as the 'Arab Spring', which
started in the early 2011. Importantly, the debate also addressed the sensitive issue
of cuts of defence spending among NATO member countries. 
Conclusions
The new threats to security, such as highly dysfunctional states, mean that the
key way of ensuring security is to contain conflicts and rebuild state structures.
Therefore, in the 21st century, NATO and the EU need to work closely together not
only to fulfil its tasks related to integration, security and prosperity of the societies
of their respective countries, but also to 'export' stability to other regions not being
part of NATO and the EU. Collective defence of territories will remain the funda-
mental mission of NATO, but crisis management operations outside the territory
covered by the Treaty are one of three core NATO tasks – next to collective defence
and cooperative security. This is also clearly reflected in the EU Common Security
and Defence Policy, which works towards safeguarding international security by cri-
sis response measures, while leaving the EU's territorial defence to NATO. At a time
of globalisation, when the geographic distance no longer protects against threats
from areas troubled by conflict and instability, expeditionary actions within the
framework of crisis management will continue to be conducted. 
Washington has sufficient military potential and its own efficient command
structure based on Regional Commands to pursue a global policy without seeking
alliance. The 2003 intervention in Iraq is a good example. American operations in
the Horn of Africa or the Middle East are currently delivered on the basis of the U.S.
Africa Command or U.S. Central Command, in cooperation with the respective
countries in the region. 
Unlike NATO, the EU does not have its own integrated peace force, and conse-
quently it does not have any specialised commands which would act according to
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unified command and control procedures24. Therefore, to date military operations
have been conducted either under NATO command structures and procedures, or
in the case of autonomous operations, according to the Berlin Plus formula, where-
by NATO has provided resources for operations conducted first by the Western
European Union based on the European security and defence identity, and then by
the European Union25. However, the formula is outdated, in particular after entry
into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
Currently, the U.S.-NATO-UE relations are not free from tensions. The U.S. is
increasingly disappointed with the defence cuts among its European allies. U.S.
political and military elites and commentators point that the economic crisis has
made life difficult for the EU and the United States alike, yet the scale of military
budget cuts among the European allies has been high enough to upset the balance,
as a result of which the United States are funding the North Atlantic Alliance to a
greater extent than previously. Statistical data clearly shows that after the Cold War,
the U.S. share of military spending amounted to 60% in 2008 (shortly before the
financial crisis) to grow to 68% and as much as 73% in 2013. If Canada were to be
excluded (in 2008 – 2%, in 2013 – 1.5%), then the share of the European NATO
member countries dropped from 30% in 2007 to 25.5% in 2013. In 2013, only three
of the 28 NATO member countries spent more than 2% GDP on defence, with the
U.S. spending 4.4%. Between 2007 and 2013, all European countries, except for
Poland, Portugal and Estonia, reduced their army budgets26. 
Concerned about the scale of cuts, NATO Secretary General warned European
governments that the previous year's reduction of military spending by 45 billion
(which is equivalent to Germany's military budget) puts the effectiveness of NATO
and its mission at stake, and jeopardises its relations with the U.S, considering fur-
ther that the U.S. itself is facing economic trouble and slashing military spending.
Faced with the situation, the Pentagon is cutting its spending on the U.S. forces sta-
tioned in Europe, which inevitably means the downsizing of the troops. NATO
deputy secretary general Aleksander R. Vershbow said that the "financial crisis has
been corrosive to the Alliance", and that relations between the European Union and
NATO remained "dysfunctional"27. 
The recent NATO mission to Libya conducted by a combined British-French
force or the French mission to Mali have exposed the military weaknesses of the
European allies. In the former operation, the U.S. supplied intelligence, aerial re-
fuelling and missiles for suppressing air defences, while in the latter, Paris request-
ed NATO for intelligence, drones and military cargo aircraft.
The end of the Cold War resulted in a number of new threats, such as breakup
and failure of states, outbreak of a number of internal conflicts, humanitarian
crises, growth of terrorism, expanding areas of political instability, forcing the
United States to reformulate its strategy. Wars in the Gulf, anti-terrorist campaigns
in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, as well as combating state dysfunc-
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tionality in Sub-Saharan Africa – all these challenges contribute to America's ever
declining interest in security issues in Europe, which was, incidentally, perceived
by Washington as an area of stability and security until the Ukrainian crisis. Therefore
it should come as no surprise that since the end of the Cold War the number of U.S.
troops in the Old Continent has been gradually declining – from 200 thousand in
1990 to 64 thousand at present. Compared to the peak of the Cold War in the 1950s
(450 thousand) this represents a reduction by 85%, and compared to 1990 by 40%. The
downsizing is even more noticeable in the air force, where the reduction has reached
75% since 199028. The United States are slowly redeploying their troops from Europe
to other regions of the world in line with its strategic interests.
However, as the events of Spring 2014 in Ukraine have shown, the loosening
of the transatlantic ties and the turning away of America from Europe are danger-
ous phenomena. For the first time since the Cold War, European countries are fac-
ing such a serious security threat, which comes not from distant destabilised coun-
tries on other continents, but emerges at the gates of the European Union, in its
eastern peripheries marked by the borders of the Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia,
Hungary and Romania.  In the worst-case scenario, the Ukrainian state may contin-
ue submerging in dysfunctionality. As is clear from recent developments, this is
exacerbated by the weakness of its state institutions and separatists tendencies
fuelled from outside by the Russian Federation, which is coming back to its impe-
rial ambitions. The situation may lead to unpredictable consequences, not only for
the countries of the Old Continent, but also the international community as a whole.
In this situation, a most urgent issue is to rebuild the mutual transatlantic trusts and
enhance military preparedness. In the years to come, NATO and the EU will keep fac-
ing the crucial challenge of building agreement as to the shape and nature of joint
allied expeditionary missions, mainly to highly-dysfunctional countries. Yet the most
pressing issue is to stabilise the situation in the nearest surroundings and restore a
strong Alliance based on common values and real military force.
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